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This paper examines the links between asset price movements and fiscal adjustments. Our 
findings suggest that a pick up in asset prices increases the probability of initiating a 
fiscal adjustment, but it does not necessarily lead to a sustainable correction of fiscal 
imbalances. However, higher real equity prices increase the probability of success. 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the current macroeconomic and financial market turmoil and in 
the presence of asset price swings expansionary fiscal policy has been at the forefront. As 
the economic recovery gathers pace, governments around the globe will start 
withdrawing some of the fiscal stimulus and initiating fiscal consolidation in order to 
ensure sustainable fiscal positions. These consolidation efforts will be affected by asset 
price movements as the economy picks up.  
As has been discussed by Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) and Schuknecht and 
Eschenbach (2004), asset prices can affect the budget via a series of channels. Directly, it 
affects via certain revenue categories, e.g., capital gains/losses related taxes. Indirectly, 
higher asset prices raise consumer confidence and consumption, via the wealth effect, and 
increase the collection of indirect taxes. Finally, in case of asset price busts and ailing 
financial institutions, the state might be asked to intervene bearing some of the costs.  
Note that the determinants of successful fiscal adjustments have been discussed 
extensively in the literature. The composition of the stabilization effort was found to be 
very important, with fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts having more chances 
to succeed rather than those based on tax hikes (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997; Alesina 
and Ardagna 1998). The size and persistence of fiscal consolidation were identified as 
quite significant determinants of adjustment efforts (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990, 1996; 
Ardagna 2004; Alesina and Ardagna 1998). In addition, fiscal adjustments have been 
linked to the underlying budgetary, economic (e.g., von Hagen and Strauch 2001; 
Ardagna 2004)1, and monetary and exchange rate conditions; with a monetary easing and 
depreciation increasing the chances of a success (e.g., Lambertini and Tavares 2005; 
Ahrend et al. 2006).  
Tagkalakis (2009) finds that labor and product market institutions can affect the 
likelihood of initiating and successfully concluding fiscal adjustment. The OECD (2007) 
and the European Commission (2007a) have shown that fiscal rules and budgetary 
procedures contribute significantly to the success of fiscal adjustment. Alesina et al. 
(2006) have shown that the likelihood of successfully concluding a fiscal consolidation 
                                                 
1 See also Heylen and Everaert (2000), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), Alesina and Ardagna (1998).   6
increases in the case of newly elected governments and in presidential systems where the 
government in office has a large margin of majority. Tavares (2004) finds that spending 
cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments, 
because these actions signal commitment to undertake the adjustment in ways that are not 
favored by their constituencies. Alesina and Perotti (1995) have shown that single party 
governments are more likely to succeed in a fiscal consolidation program compared to 
coalition governments 
The present paper building on previous literature goes on step further by 
investigating whether asset prices movements have any effect on the probability of 
initiating and successfully concluding fiscal adjustment. Following earlier studies, e.g., 
Borio and Lowe (2002) we use a real aggregate asset price index (taken from the Bank of 
International Settlements-BIS) and its three subcomponents, real residential, real 
commercial and real equity prices (see Appendix). One could expect that an increase in 
asset prices would generate additional government revenues contributing positively to the 
initiation of a consolidation effort. However, given that asset prices are very volatile and 
that the windfall revenues they generate are hardly persistent, it is likely that the 
improvement in fiscal balances will not be sustainable. Alternatively, a fall in asset prices 
might lead to additional spending on the part of the government as a way to stabilize the 
financial system and to boost economic activity. 
Our findings suggest that a pick up in asset prices increases the probability of 
initiating a fiscal adjustment, but does not necessarily lead to a sustainable correction of 
fiscal imbalances. However, higher real equity prices increase the probability of success. 
The rest of the paper is organized along the following line. Section 2 investigates 
whether asset prices movements affect the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment. 
Section 3 discusses whether asset price movements increase the probability of success, 
and Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The probability of initiating fiscal consolidation 
Using annual data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1970 to 2000, this section 
analyzes the effect of asset prices on the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment.   7
Following Tavares (2004) and Tagkalakis (2009), we define a fiscal consolidation as the 
increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) by at least 1.5% of GDP in a 
single period.  
 
2.1 Control variables  
To control for the role played by initial conditions, we consider the effect that the 
lagged output gap has on the probability of initiating a fiscal consolidation. One could 
expect that a fiscal adjustment is more likely in better economic times (von Hagen and 
Strauch, 2001).
2 Turning to the budgetary conditions prior to the consolidation episode, 
the higher is the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (or the lower is the surplus - CAPBY) 
and the debt to GDP ratio (Debt), the more pressing the need to correct fiscal imbalances. 
Following Lambertini and Tavares (2005), we control for monetary and exchange rate 
conditions. We use the lagged value of the log of the real effective exchange rate (Reer) 
and the lagged value of the real short term interest rate (RIRS). Exchange rate 
depreciation and monetary easing can boost economic activity, facilitating the initiation 
of a fiscal consolidation effort.  
We take also into account the following political variables: (i) ideology, which is 
measured as the proportion of all cabinet portfolios that are held by left parties; (ii) the 
margin of majority, that is the fraction of seats held by the government in the parliament; 
(iii) years in office, 
 that is how many years has the chief executive had in office; (iv) 
elections in the year prior to the adjustment episode; (v) government fractionalization, 
which is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government 
parties will be from different parties. One might expect that sharp fiscal adjustments are 
more likely to be initiated by left-wing governments, possibly because of their ability to 
build a broader social consensus.
3 The adjustment could be more likely when the 
government in office has a strong majority in parliament and when it does not have many 
                                                 
2 Tagkalakis (2008) has shown that in bad economic times expansionary fiscal policy can boost private 
consumption in the presence of credit constraints. Therefore, a fiscal adjustment is less likely in bad 
economic times, especially in countries with less developed financial systems.  
3 However, Tavares (2004) has shown that right-wing and left-wing governments do not have different 
effects. Instead, what matters is the intention of the two poles of the political spectrum to build credibility 
by engaging in policies which are not favored by their constituencies, i.e., the right-wing parties increase 
taxes and the left-wing parties cut spending.    8
years in office, so that it is not affected by stabilization fatigue. Fiscal stabilizations are 
less likely to be initiated at times of elections; instead, it is more likely to start after 
elections. Finally, government fractionalization is expected, as shown by Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002), to lead to additional spending, implying that coalition governments 
lack the discipline and the power required to engage in ambitious fiscal consolidation.  
 
2.2 Estimation  
Our starting point is a specification which includes all political variables and 
where we use the change in real aggregate asset price (DRAAP) (Table 1, column 1). 
Focusing on the variable of interest, we see that a pick up in real aggregate asset prices 
increases the likelihood of starting a fiscal consolidation. Analogous results are reported 
in column 2 where we discard most of the political variables (except years in office) 
because they are statistically insignificant. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in the 
change in real aggregate asset prices increases the likelihood of initiating  fiscal 
consolidation by about 3.7%  (in column 2) to  4.6% (in column 1).
4 
As discussed above, asset prices movements have a direct effect on the budget via 
certain revenue categories. This could imply that the improvement in fiscal balances is 
somehow automatic and not necessarily driven by the decision of the policy maker to 
capitalize on this positive development and pursue ambitious fiscal adjustment. 
Alternatively, the timing of the fiscal impact might depend on the presence of collection 
lags. To control for this, we use the lagged value of the change in the real aggregate asset 
prices in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1. Both the magnitude and the statistical significance 
of the relevant coefficient estimates have diminished. However, we still obtain 
statistically significant results in column 4, but now a one standard deviation increase in 




                                                 
4 The main emphasis is on the qualitative aspect of the results; however, the way to read these findings is to 
multiply the standard deviations of all variables (see Table 7) with the respective coefficient estimate (e.g. 
in case of DRAAP it is 0.0973234). The reader should take into account that some of the political variables 
are indices, so we can just examine the effect of an incremental change in the index considered.  
5 The standard deviation of the lagged value of DRAAP is 0.0976484. 
6 Given the fact that the role of asset prices is at the heart of this study, we only briefly summarize the 
findings referring to the control variables. As reported in Table 1 the higher is the cyclically adjusted   9
Next we use the disaggregated asset price series; these are the changes in real 
commercial property prices (DRCP), real residential property prices (DRRP), and real 
equity prices (DREP). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the findings when we use their 
contemporaneous values. All of them appear to have a positive effect on the probability 
of initiating a fiscal adjustment, but the effect is highly statistically significant only in the 
case of the real equity prices. Therefore, it is primarily real equity prices and secondarily 
real residential property prices that drive the results of the aggregate asset price index.  
Turning to the alternative specification with the lagged values of the 
disaggregated asset price series, we see that it is real residential property prices that 
primarily contribute positively to the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment (columns 
3 and 4 of Table 2). The coefficient estimates on real commercial property and real equity 
prices are insignificant and at times negative.  
All in all, there are indications that it is mostly increases in real residential and 
real equity prices that contribute positively to the likelihood of initiating a fiscal 
adjustment. This should have been expected given the importance of stamp duty taxes, 
property taxes, and the fact that in most cases capital gains (including from equity) are 
treated as income liable to personal income tax.  
 
3. The determinants of a successful fiscal consolidation 
In defining a successful fiscal consolidation we follow previous studies e.g., 
Lambertini and Tavares (2005) and Tagkalakis (2009). A sharp fiscal consolidation at 
time t is considered to be successful if the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) 
does not deteriorate three years after the end of the fiscal consolidation (at time t+3) i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                   
primary deficit in t-1 (or the lower is the surplus) the greater the probability of a fiscal adjustment at time t. 
This is in line with other studies (OECD, 2007; Tagkalakis, 2009). The higher is the debt ratio the bigger 
the chances for an adjustment to take place in the next period. Good economic conditions as indicated by a 
positive output gap have a positive but not statistically significant coefficient estimate. Real exchange rate 
depreciation (a fall in Reer) makes more likely the initiation of a fiscal adjustment in the coming period (as 
in Lambertini and Tavares 2005 and Tagkalakis 2009), because it is expected to boost economic activity. A 
monetary easing (lower real interest) does not affect the probability of initiating a fiscal consolidation. The 
coefficient estimates of the variables that control for political conditions are insignificant, except of the one 
capturing how many years has the chief executive in office. As was expected, if the government is in office 
for many years then the probability to start a fiscal adjustment diminishes dramatically, possibly because of 
stabilization fatigue.     10
CAPBYt+3≥CAPBYt.
   Note that reverse causation is avoided by using a dependent 
variable which depends on information available 3 years in the future, while the 
independent variables are measured at the time of or before the adjustment episode 
(Tavares, 2004). Moreover, in line with Ardagna (2004), we incorporate information 
from country-years in which fiscal discipline is a problem but governments do not 
undertake substantial fiscal adjustments. This information is valuable and will be lost if 
we include only those episodes in which there is evidence of large fiscal adjustments. In 
line with earlier work on the field (e.g., Tavares, 2004; Ardagna, 2004) we control for the 




3.1 Estimation  
The baseline specifications presented in Table 3 (columns 1-3) indicate that the 
change in the real aggregate asset prices does not affect the probability of success in a 
significant manner. This finding holds even if we discard the insignificant political 
variables (Table 4, columns 1-3). However, both the magnitude and the sign of the 
coefficient estimate depend on the control variable used (size and composition). Hence, 
the evidence obtained so far suggests that although asset prices increases generate 
windfall tax revenues, these are not persistent and are likely to be reversed in the near 
future (when asset prices fall), working against a sustainable improvement of fiscal 
balances.    
Turning now to the disaggregated asset price series we get a more complex 
picture. As reported in Tables 5 and 6, the change in real equity prices contributes 
positively to the objective of fiscal consolidation. This implies that higher real equity 
prices improve significantly the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation; with their 
effect working through higher capital gains taxes and/or wealth effects which lead to 
higher consumption and higher indirect tax revenues. On top of that, there is an indication 
                                                 
7 We control for the “size effect”, as in Tavares (2004), using the change in the primary balance as a share 
of GDP (Change in primary balance). Following Ardagna (2004), we use the change in the cyclically 
adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a share of GDP (Change in Spending), and the 
change in the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a share of GDP (Change in Revenue) in order to control 
for the “composition effect”.   11
that an increase in real residential property prices (Table 5, column 1), if anything 
reduces the likelihood of success. The same applies for real commercial property prices 
but its coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.  
Overall, although we can say that asset price movements and the tax revenue 
changes they entail can contribute positively to the consolidation effort, it is unlikely that 
they will contribute to a sustainable correction in fiscal imbalances. A more 
disaggregated look confirms this finding both for real residential and real commercial 
prices. On the contrary, increases in real equity prices, by affecting certain tax revenue 




 4. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to improve our understanding of the links between 
asset price movements and fiscal adjustments. Our findings indicate that asset price 
movements contribute positively to fiscal adjustment. However, it is unlikely that they 
will lead to a sustainable correction in fiscal imbalances. This finding is reaffirmed both 
for residential and commercial property prices. This is in line with the recent experiences 
of several countries which faced a rapid deterioration of tax revenues following the 
collapse of residential activity and prices.  However, increases in equity prices contribute 
positively both to the initiation and the successful conclusion of a fiscal adjustment.  
                                                 
8 As regards the control variables (see Table 3), we conclude that bad initial budgetary conditions  increase 
the probability of success (as in e.g., Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Ardagna 2004; Lamberini and Tavares 
2005; Tagkalakis 2009). Economic conditions, as measured by the output gap, do not appear to affect 
significantly the probability of success. A depreciation of the real exchange rate (a fall in Reer) increases 
the probability of a lasting fiscal correction (as in Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Lambertini and Tavares 
2005; Tagkalakis 2009). The coefficient of the real interest rate is not always significant and provides 
mixed signals. In accord with Ardagna (2004) and Tagkalakis (2009), the bigger the size of the fiscal 
adjustment the higher the probability that fiscal consolidations will be successful. In line with previous 
studies (Tavares 2004; Lambertini and Tavares 2005; Tagkalakis 2009), expenditure saving and revenue 
increasing measures contribute positively to the success of fiscal adjustment.  
The coefficient estimates of all political variables, except government fractionalization, are statistically 
insignificant. Government fractionalization appears to raise the probability of a successful fiscal 
consolidation. This is, however, at odds with what might have been expected. As has been shown by Perotti 
and Kontopoulos (2002), a fractionalized (coalition) government results in increased spending, which 
would probably reduce the chances of a sustainable correction of fiscal imbalances. However, one possible 
explanation could be that coalition governments can build the social consensus required to initiate and 
succeed in ambitious fiscal consolidation programs.   12
Fiscal policy makers should focus their attention on the sustainable improvement 
in fiscal balances by adopting measures of a structural nature. In doing that they should 
also take on board, on top of the effect of the economic cycle, the effects that asset price 
movements have on fiscal balances, in order to have a better grasp of the actual fiscal 
stance and the realized fiscal outcomes.    13
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Appendix 
We used a yearly unbalanced panel data set (1975-2000) of 17 OECD economies: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and United 
States.  
The macroeconomic variables used extend from 1975 to 2000.  Fiscal and output 
variables are from the OECD Economic Outlook (OECD, 2007) and the definitions used 
are: the lagged value of the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP 
(CAPBY), the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP 
(DCAPBY),  the lagged value of the debt to GDP ratio (Debt), the lagged value of the 
output gap (Output gap), the lagged value of the short term real interest rate (RIRS), the 
change in the primary balance as a share of GDP (Change in primary balance), the 
change in cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a share of 
GDP (Change in Spending), the change in cyclically adjusted total revenues as a share of 
GDP (Change in Revenue). The lagged value of the log of the real effective exchange 
rate (Reer) comes from the AMECO database of the European Commission (2007b).  
Asset prices indices were provided by the BIS. The main indicator is annual the 
change in the log of aggregate real asset prices (DRAAP), which covers 1975-2000 for 17 
industrial countries and combines price indices for three asset classes - equities, 
residential property and commercial property – by weighting the components using 
shares of the asset classes in private sector wealth. The private consumption deflator is 
used to convert nominal to real asset prices. In addition, we considered also the change in 
the log of the three disaggregate asset price indicators, i.e., real commercial prices 
(DRCP), real residential prices (DRRP) and real equity prices (DREP).  
The variable “margin of majority” is the fraction of seats held by the government. 
It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total seats. The variable 
“years in office”, reports how many years the chief executive has left in office. The 
lagged value of the variable “elections” captures whether there were legislative or 
executive elections in the year prior to the adjustment episode. The variable “government 
fractionalization” reflects the probability that two deputies picked at random from among   16
the government parties will be of different parties. All four variables extends from 1975-
2000 and are taken from Keefer (2005). The ideology index is based on information on 
left party cabinet portfolios as a percent of all cabinet portfolios. It takes values from 0 to 
5 (see Tagkalakis, 2009), the bigger is the value of the ideology index the closer is the 
government to the left of the political spectrum. Data extend from 1975 to 2000 and are 
taken from Swank (2003).  
 
 
Table 1: The probability of starting fiscal consolidation –baseline regression 
Variables 1  2  3  4 
CAPBY(t-1) -0.0329*** 
(-5.05)    
-0.0234*** 
(-5.69)    
-0.0326*** 
(-5.09)     
-0.0237*** 
(-5.26)    
Debt (t-1)  0.0021** 









Output gap (t-1)  0.0097 
(1.49) 
-0.0012 




(-0.75)    
Reer (t-1)  -0.70919*** 
(-3.86)    
-0.3835*** 
(-3.72)    
-0.7493*** 
(-4.05)    
-0.4152*** 
(-3.89)    
Monetary 
conditions 
RIRS (t-1)  0.0041 
(0.77) 
0.0047 
(1.37)     
0.0019 






(2.38)   
0.3858*** 
(3.58)    
  
 DRAAP(t-1)      0.1809 
(0.81)    
0.1634* 
(1.93) 
Years in office   -0.0126** 
(-2.24)  
-0.0099** 
(-2.54)    
-0.0138** 
(-2.38)    
-0.0108*** 
(-2.60)    












(0.66)     
 
 Elections  (t-1)  -00123 
(-0.44) 
 -0.0129 







(0.67)    
 
 Pseudo  R2  0.305  0.305  0.288  0.269 
  No of obs.  258  374  258  374 
 Observed  P    0.1782  0.1417  0.1782  0.1417 
 Predicted  P  0.0652  0.0453  0.0694  0.0507 
  Log L                        -84.005               -105.95              -86.028            -111.52           
Notes: Probit estimates – dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report 
dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the 
change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a 
change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. 
Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
   17
Table 2: The probability of starting fiscal consolidation – disaggregated asset price 
series  
Variables 1  2  3  4 
CAPBY(t-1)  -0.0343*** 
(-5.39)     
-0.0245*** 
(-6.04)    
-0.0330*** 
(-5.20)    
-0.0255*** 
(-5.29)    
Debt (t-1)  0.0015 
(1.40) 
0.0006 
(1.05)    
0.0018* 
(1.77)    
0.00067 
(1.07)    
Initial 
conditions 
Output gap (t-1)  0.0108 
(1.51)    
0.00409 
(0.82)    
0.0013 
(0.15)    
-0.0051 
(-0.84)    
Reer (t-1)  -0.6619*** 
(-3.81)    
-0.3917*** 
(-3.50)    
-0.7718*** 
(-3.91)    
-0.4518*** 
(-3.68)    
Monetary 
conditions 
RIRS (t-1)  0.0014 
(0.26)    
0.0043 
(1.18)    
0.0004 
(0.07)    
0.0063 
(1.57)    
Real Asset 
Prices 
DRCP  0.0341 
(0.27)    
0.0423 
(0.48)      
  
 DRRP 0.3574 
(1.42)    
0.2398 
(1.39)    
  
 DREP 0.2454*** 
(2.62)    
0.2372*** 
(4.50)    
  
 DRCP(t-1)    -0.0621 
(-0.54)    
-0.0906 
(-0.97)    
 DRRP(t-1)    0.5163* 
(1.81)    
0.4080** 
(2.03)     
 DREP(t-1)    -0.0749 
(-0.71)    
0.0713 
(1.24) 
Years in office   -0.0092 
(-1.61)    
-0.0089** 
(-2.14)    
-0.0142** 
(-2.34)    
-0.0123** 
(-2.59)    
Ideology   0.0050 
(0.44)    
 0.0018 




Margin of majority  0.0594 
(0.32)    
 0.0301 
(0.16)    
 
 Elections  (t-1)  -0.0096 
(-0.34)    
 -0.0092 





(1.06)    
 0.1221 
(1.20)    
 
 Pseudo  R2  0.326  0.3242 0.302  0.278 
  No  of  obs. 248 333 246 331 
 Observed  P    0.1814  0.1531 0.1829 0.1540 
 Predicted  P  0.0600    0.0437    0.0659  0.0525 
  Log L                         -79.074                  -96.348            -81.702            -102.689             
Notes: Probit estimates – dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report 
dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the 
change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, 
a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 3: The probability of successful fiscal consolidation – baseline specification  
Variables 1  2  3 
CAPBY(t-1) -0.00127*** 
(-3.49)     
-0.0075*** 
(-4.05)    
-0.00217*** 
(-4.10)   
Debt (t-1)  0.00021*** 
(3.44)    
0.0010*** 





Output gap (t-1)  0.00018 
(0.64) 
0.0022 
(1.55)    
-0.00039 
(-1.00)    
Reer (t-1)  -0.0219*** 
(-2.77)     
-0.1588*** 
(-3.52)     
-0.0559*** 
(-3.89)    
Monetary 
conditions 
RIRS (t-1)  0.0006* 
(1.92)    
0.00208 
(1.35)    
-0.00002 
(-0.08)    
Size   Change in primary 
balance 
0.00258*** 
(3.77)    
  
Composition Change  in  Spending   -0.0056*** 
(-2.61)    
 





(-0.28)    
0.0143 
(0.31)    
0.0162 
(1.53) 
 DRAAP(t-1)       
Years in office   -0.00007 
(-0.37)    
-0.0007 
(-0.70)    
-0.000039 
(-0.15)    
Ideology   0.00029 
(0.61)    
0.00109 












(1.07)    
 Elections  (t-1)  -0.00015 
(-0.14)    
-0.0066 
(-1.37)    
-0.00159 




(2.22)    
0.0605*** 
(2.70)    
0.0160** 
(2.16) 
 Pseudo  R2  0.574  0.480  0.571 
  No of obs.  254  254  254 
 Observed  P    0.1181  0.1181  0.1181 
 Predicted  P  0.0010  0.0069  0.0013 
  Log L                        -39.297               -47.965              -39.521            
Notes: Probit estimates – dependent variable: probability of success. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, 
i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables 
(the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a 
dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at 
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Table 4: The probability of successful fiscal consolidation  
Variables 1  2  3 
CAPBY(t-1) -0.00193*** 
(-2.97)    
-0.0064*** 
(-4.27)    
-0.0019*** 
(-4.58)    
Debt (t-1)  0.00028** 
(2.52) 
0.00064** 





Output gap (t-1)  -0.0001 
(-0.18)    
0.0009 
(0.64)    
-0.0007 
(-1.60)    
Reer (t-1)  -0.0574*** 
(-2.70)    
-0.1636*** 
(-3.39)    
-0.0657*** 
(-4.41)    
Monetary 
conditions 











Composition Change  in  Spending   -0.0061*** 
(-2.90)    
 





(-1.21)    
-0.0001 
(-0.00)    
0.0060 
(0.88) 
 DRAAP(t-1)       
Years in office        





    








(2.48)    
 Pseudo  R2  0.532  0.448  0.538 
  No of obs.  297  297  297 
 Observed  P    0.1043  0.1043  0.1043 
 Predicted  P  0.0028  0.0077  0.0017 
  Log L                        -46.453               -54.789              -45.856            
Notes: Probit estimates – dependent variable: probability of success. For each independent variable we report 
dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent 
variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control 
variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based 
on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** 
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Table 5: The probability of successful fiscal consolidation  
Variables 1  2  3 
CAPBY(t-1) -
0.00025*** 
(4.58)    
-0.0034*** 
(-4.73)    
-0.00048*** 
(-4.59)    













(-0.04)   
Reer (t-1)  -
0.00469*** 
(-4.03)   
-0.0791*** 
(-4.19)    
-0.0133*** 
(-4.90)    
Monetary 
conditions 





(-0.74)    





Composition  Change in Spending    -0.00249*** 
(-2.70)    
 





(-1.20)    
-0.01046 
(-1.06)    
-0.0009 
(-0.68)    
 DRRP  -0.0036* 
(-1.76)     
-0.0122 
(-0.55)    
-0.0002 
(-0.08)    






 DRCP(t-1)       
 DRRP(t-1)       
 DREP(t-1)       
Years in office   5.67e-06 




(0.32)    














 Elections  (t-1)  0.0002 
(0.74) 
-0.0017 
(-0.74)    
-0.00008 









 Pseudo  R2  0.639  0.524  0.613 
  No of obs.  244  244  244 
 Observed  P    0.1229  0.1229  0.1229 
 Predicted  P  0.0001  0.0024  0.0002 
  Log L                         -32.819           -43.230              -35.122            
Notes: Probit estimates – dependent variable: probability of success. For each independent variable we report 
dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent 
variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control 
variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based 
on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** 
significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 6: The probability of successful fiscal consolidation  
Variables 1  2  3 
CAPBY(t-1) -
0.00165*** 
(-3.52)    
-0.00377*** 
(-4.65)    
-0.00077*** 
(-5.24)     













(-0.47)    
Reer (t-1)  -0.0398*** 
(-2.79)    
-0.09029*** 
(-3.68)    
-0.02095*** 
(-4.79)    
Monetary 
conditions 





(-0.12)    





Composition  Change in Spending    -0.0019* 
(-1.86)    
 





(-0.55)    
-0.0122 
(-0.91)    
-0.0018 
(-0.79)    
 DRRP  -0.0075 











 DRCP(t-1)       
 DRRP(t-1)       
 DREP(t-1)       
Years in office        
Ideology        
Political  
Variables 
Margin of majority       









 Pseudo  R2  0.552  0.493  0.592 
  No of obs.  286  286  286 
 Observed  P    0.1083  0.1083  0.1083 
 Predicted  P  0.0016  0.0031  0.0004 
  Log L                         -43.922           -49.669              -39.983            
Notes: Probit estimates – dependent variable: probability of success. For each independent variable we report 
dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent 
variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control 
variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based 
on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** 
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Table 7: Means and standard deviations of the variables 
Variables  Mean Standard 
deviation 
CAPBY(t-1)  0.0409071 
3.068919 
Debt (t-1)  58.73331 
28.33435 
Output gap (t-1)  -0.559612 
2.380117 
Reer (t-1)  4.666241 
0.1902641 
RIRS (t-1)  2.950323 
3.783896 
Change in primary balance  0.0321937 
1.773697 
Change in spending  0.1468274 
1.629173 
Change in revenue  0.1698888 
1.401889 
Ideology  2.329323 
1.600489 
Majority  0.5411531 
0.1003404 
Elections  0.2980392 
0.4578459 
Years in office  3.62279 
2.77984 
Government fractionalization  0.2743808 
0 .2704383 




DRCP  0.0002724 
0.1248746 
DRRP  0.022727 
0.0732488 
DREP  0.0236137 
0.2022527 
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